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ABSTRACT
GUZEL GARIFULLINA: Budget priorities in hybrid regimes: elections and the effect of
crisis
(Under the direction of GraemeRobertson.)
This research project uses public spending to approximate for policy decisions in hybrid
regimes. I look at two specific kinds of challenges that may destabilize hybrids - and exter-
nal economic crisis (in the same way it affects other regimes) and popular elections (which
create uncertainty and a dual challenge from masses and elites to the incumbent’s power).
Starting from the well-developed research literature on regime survival, I argue that regime
stability will depend not only on the severity and nature of challenge to the regime, but also
on the response strategy adopted by the incumbent leader. Exploring response strategies
through the lens of spending dynamics in the Russian regions in 2001-2014, I build and
use a two-dimensional decision space, containing the trade-off between long-term (invest-
ment) and short-term (consumption) spending strategies, as well as redistribution between
the elites and the mass groups in the short term. I show that the economic crisis is associated
with a decrease of spending on supporting the economy and health care (long-term) and an
increase of spending on social welfare (short-term). Elections are shown to have a positive
effect on spending on the bureaucracy (elite) and a negative effect on mass social welfare
programs. That supports the hypotheses that an economic crisis motivates redistribution to
immediate needs, and leaders facing elections prefer redistribution to elite groups to ensure
their support. Election competitiveness strengthens the latter effect. The proposed theory
adds to our understanding of nondemocratic regime functioning and dynamics.
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INTRODUCTION
Hybrid regimes have become both a widespread political model and a popular research
subject. By some evaluations, this term describes ”roughly between one quarter and one
third of all states” (Diamond 2002), - so it comes as no surprise that understanding policy
process and choices made by them are crucial for our knowledge of the political world. Yet
most of the internal mechanics eludes direct observation and is therefore hard to study. This
research project uses public spending to approximate for policy trade-offs and decisions in
hybrid regimes.
I start with the basic assumption that the regime tries to ensure its survival when consid-
ering policy options. Similar to Wright and Escriba-Folch (2012), I define regime survival
as the situation when the same leader or elite stays in power as opposed to a situation when
the current regime is replaced by a democratic one, or a rival non-democratic regime. As
it has been shown in the studies of authoritarian regimes, challenges to regime survival can
come from within (social change, popular protest, elite split - Geddes (1999), De Mesquita
(2005)) and from outside (global economic crisis, diffusion and international pressure -
Haggard and Kaufman (1997), Gleditsch and Ward (2006)). I look at two examples of chal-
lenges: external economic crisis and elections as an internal political challenge. Both have
been extensively studied in the literature, yet the research delivers contradictory findings
as to whether these factors contribute to regime stability or increase the probability of it
falling.
At the first glance, implementing policies that promote economic development should
beneficial for the autocrat’s survival. As Haggard and Kaufman (1997), Reuter and Gandhi
(2011), Tanneberg, Stefes and Merkel (2013), among others, have demonstrated, non-
democratic regimes are especially vulnerable during economic downturns1 . Therefore,
1 Finkel, Muller and Seligson (1989) argue that this is not the case for democratic regimes
avoiding crises (or making them shorter and less profound) and providing stable economic
development helps these regimes ensure their stability (see, for example Epstein, Bates,
Goldstone, Kristensen and O’Halloran (2006)). From the other side, economic growth can
have a destabilizing effect on a non-democratic regime. In accordance with moderniza-
tion theory, economic development leads to social changes, differentiation in the politi-
cal sphere, emergence of a more complex social structure, the rise of democratization de-
mands among the population, and ultimately to democratization (Lipset 1959; Przeworski
and Limongi 1997; Boix and Stokes 2003). These things being literally synonymous to
regime destabilization, it is unclear what effect economic development would have on a
hybrid regime.
Elections in nondemocratic regimes were once perceived as being a simple window
dressing. Yet it was later demonstrated that they can have liberalizing (and thus destabi-
lizing from the point of view of the incumbent) effect. Howard and Roessler (2006) show
that even under restricted competition elections can lead bring a new, less authoritarian,
government. Ekman (2009) shows how the probability of regime breakdown increases with
the interaction between opposition parties and citizens. However, other authors argue that
democratizing outcome is not that predetermined - even if authoritarian elections result in
regime breakdown (Levitsky and Way 2010). Moreover, there is growing literature on the
positive effects of such institutions as elections, parties or legislatures on nondemocratic
regime stability. As demonstrated in recent research (Blaydes 2010; Gandhi and Lust-Okar
2009), elections can be used as a way to gather information about supporters, so that this
information can be used to selectively reward and punish, effectively preventing both elite
conflicts and popular protest.2
From this it becomes apparent that actual effect of economic development and elections
on regime stability is more complex than it appears at first glance. I argue that one of
the intervening factors will be the policies of the regime itself - more specifically, how the
regime manages these challenges, which policy responses are adopted to face them. That
2 Pop-Eleches and Robertson (2015) argue that elections in nondemocratic regimes play and informational
role, and can lead to both deliberalization and liberalization depending on regime’s transparency.
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is, the contradictions above can be explained by the different reactions to economic and
electoral challenges adopted by the regimes. I use budget spending to approximate specific
policy priorities and explore how hybrid regimes respond to external economic crisis and
the presence of popular elections of the leader.
Redistribution in favor of specific groups or policy objectives can be a powerful policy
tool, creating incentives and ensuring support. It includes direct redistribution of transfers
(to mass groups), redistribution through patronage (spending on elite groups) and long-
term policies (investing in education), among others. I use subnational budget data from
the Russian regions in 2001-2014. This allows me to exploit cross-regional variation in
regime competitiveness as well as two time-specific variables: the absence of gubernatorial
popular elections in the period 2005-2012 and world financial crisis of 2008-2009, while
keeping context, historical and cultural variables constant. I find that in response to external
economic crisis regional governments cut spending and concentrate on short-term policies
supporting day-to-day operation and survival at the expense of long-term economic policies.
Elections are associated with relative redistribution towards elite groups - that is, an increase
in the share of budget spent on bureaucracy, which supports the hypothesis of the use of
patronage in voter mobilization.
The major contribution this paper is offering to the studies of hybrid regimes is propos-
ing a mechanism that links challenges to regime stability with response strategies chosen
by the incumbent, a mechanism based on public spending. The proposed approach inte-
grates various accounts of authoritarian and hybrid regime strategies, including such policy
choices as economic development, public goods provision and repression, into one two-
dimensional space. This allows us to better understand the dilemmas hybrid regimes face
in the described situations, to explore the internal dynamics of hybrid regimes, the decisions
they make and through that - to compare them with other types of regimes. Furthermore,
it contributes to the studies on regime dynamics by focusing on regime’s adaptive capacity
and strategies.
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Regime survival and policy responses
Nondemocratic regime dynamics
Before hybrid regimes became a highly studied (and more widespread) phenomenon,
the issue of authoritarian regime survival has been extensively studied as part of democra-
tization literature. Classic works paid attention to both endogenous and exogenous factors
of survival.
Endogenous political challenges to authoritarian regimes can be further divided into
those originating from within the elite groups and those coming from the masses. Bratton
and Van de Walle (1992) demonstrate that popular protest has a positive effect on the prob-
ability of regime change. As proposed by De Mesquita (2005) and Magaloni and Kricheli
(2010), the goals of an autocrat who wants to keep her position can be subdivided into en-
suring the continuing support of elite groups and achieving the acquiescence of the masses.
The use of specific instruments to face these challenges will depend on the source of the
most pressing threat to stability the elites or the masses, respectively (Svolik 2012). Besides
political challenges, one can think of endogenous social or economic challenges, such as
demographic changes or internal economic crises and their effect on regime survival (Lutz,
Cuaresma and Abbasi-Shavazi 2010; Weber 2013; Remmer 1990; Gasiorowski 1995). Ex-
ogenous factors of regime instability include spillover effects (Starr and Lindborg 2003;
Lankina and Getachew 2006; Gleditsch and Ward 2006), foreign influence/intervention
Finkel, Pe´rez-Lin˜a´n and Seligson (2007)3 , or global economic crises (Pepinsky 2012).
Hybrid (or electoral authoritarian) regimes combine authoritarian and democratic prac-
tices for legitimation (Way and Levitsky 2002). Their proliferation on the international
political arena (Schedler 2002) in the end of the 20th century attracted political scientists’
attention and caused important debates in the field. One of them is the mere definition of
the term. Thus, Diamond (2002) distinguishes ”competitive authoritarian” or ”hegemonic
electoral authoritarian” hybrid regimes as being types of authoritarian regime. The level of
3 For how external influence can stabilize nondemocratic regimes - see for example the literature on ”black
knights” (Chou 2015; Tolstrup 2015)
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competitiveness acts as the major criterion for this distinction. Developing the discussion,
Gilbert and Mohseni (2011) propose a multidimensional approach to conceptualization,
which identifies hybrid regimes as non-democratic and non-authoritarian. For the purposes
of this project I define, very generally, a hybrid regime as a nondemocratic regime which
has somewhat competitive elections at least at some levels of authority.
Hybrid regimes seem to face most of the same types of challenges as other nondemo-
cratic regimes. Yet as relatively competitive elections are the major characteristic distin-
guishing them from purely authoritarian regimes, most authors focus on consequences of
elections for hybrid regimes (Howard and Roessler 2006; Brownlee 2009; Blaydes 2010;
Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009).
I will therefore focus on elections as an example of internal political challenge to hybrid
regime stability and an exogenous economic shock as an external challenge. An economic
crisis is a threat to the masses’ economic well-being, which creates social tension as more
people require support while the state itself suffers from dropping levels of revenue. This
represents a challenge to regime’s output legitimacy and stability. Elections in nondemo-
cratic regimes serve to demonstrate regime strength to citizens and elites, prevent elite splits
and defection, monitor and motivate supporters (Pop-Eleches and Robertson 2015; Geddes
2005; Gandhi 2008). But besides all those benefits they are also a moment of uncertainty.
The leader faces the simultaneous threat from organized opposition, masses, and the elite
coalition itself, so ensuring necessary results and managing these challenges becomes cru-
cial. This is especially true given the fact that the stakes are higher for autocratic leaders
facing elections.
How regimes respond to challenges
To address these challenges, the incumbent must adopt response strategies. The existing
research has either no or contradictory explanations of how these strategies actually work.
I argue the adopted strategies will affect the outcome - in this case, regime resilience.
Many studies focus on how economic crisis influences authoritarian/hybrid regimes’
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survival, but much less is known about the response of these regimes to the challenge4 .
If the regime doesn’t fall due to economic crisis, how does it manage to do so? As for
elections, researchers argue that elections are used not just by the opposition to challenge
the incumbent, but also by the regime itself to collect information and then apply additional
strategies to selectively reward and punish both elites and masses (Blaydes (2010); Gandhi
and Lust-Okar (2009)). Yet the specific ways these strategies are used are much harder to
capture. Doing that would allow us to understand how the mechanism of nondemocratic
elections works.
The general policy choices available to nondemocratic regimes have been studied be-
fore. Gandhi and Przeworski (2006) describe how authoritarian regimes use policy conces-
sions (through institutions such as legislatures and parties) and distribution of spoils in order
to survive. Escriba`-Folch (2013) shows that the use of repression (such as political terror
and restrictions on civil liberties) is a policy choice positively associated with authoritarian
regime survival.
Hybrid regimes may have more policy choices available to them due to their dual nature
(and includes, for example, electoral manipulation or co-optation of the opposition through
elected legislatures), but is also facing restrictions unknown to authoritarian regimes. For
example, as argued by Way and Levitsky (2002), policies available to incumbents in these
regimes include ”bribery, co-optation, and various forms of ”legal” persecution”. At the
same time, Smith (2009) specifies that ”tools employed by the electoral authoritarian regime
depend on a number of factors related to nature of the regime and level of competition it
faces”. Higher regime competitiveness, freedom of speech, quality of organized political
opposition can all restrict the leader’s choice of policy instruments.
I argue that one of the important policy instruments available to any regime is public
spending. I will speak more to this in the following sections, here I review some literature
4 There are studies of authoritarian economic policies and the likeliness of reform for the review, see
Haggard and Webb (1993). They note the inconclusiveness on empirical findings. Coming from a different
strand of literature, Pepinsky (2009) uses the cases of Indonesia and Malaysia and shows how the structure
of elite coalitions based on the nature of assets influences adjustment policies during crisis and ultimately
regime survival. His argument focuses on elite dynamics when explaining regime breakdown.
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showing how states adapt their spending priorities in response to the two types of challenges
I discussed earlier: economic crisis and elections.
The literature on public spending discusses adaptation to economic crisis among other
factors influencing the choice between public investment and public consumption the (see,
for example, Beramendi, Ha¨usermann, Kitschelt and Kriesi (2015)). Focusing on social
policies, Beramendi et al. define social investment as ”policies aimed at increasing peo-
ples capacity for future earnings”, while social consumption contains ”social expenditures
aimed at immediate income restoration”. On a sample of OECD countries, Breunig and
Busemeyer (2012) demonstrate that when the governments are facing difficult trade-offs
due to fiscal stress, it is easier to cut discretionary spending (public investment) than en-
titlement spending (public consumption). It has also been shown, that in Latin America
economic crisis leads to a shift from ”investment” strategies and concentration on ”con-
sumption” strategies in that case, from investing in public good like health care and educa-
tion to social welfare (Huber, Mustillo and Stephens 2008). This is true for both democratic
and authoritarian regimes, the authors also note that highly repressive authoritarian regimes
are able to control spending on public goods (investment), while expanding funding for
social security (consumption). In summation, the public spending literature seems to agree
that an economic crisis generally results in a shift from long-term investment strategies to
short-term consumption strategies, at least in the area of social spending.
The issue of nondemocratic elections can be approached from two major positions. On
the one hand, following the challenges framework, elections represent a challenge from
the masses, giving power to the electorate. As a response, the incumbent may want to
redistribute resources to the voters. On the other hand, the incumbent may use more indirect
means of vote mobilization - one of them being redistribution to specific elite groups.
In line with the first idea, it has been shown (Miller 2014, 2015) that autocratic regimes
holding elections use them as an information-gathering device to later adjust their policies.
Based on the data about 269 autocratic elections in 86 countries from 1975 to 2004, Miller
shows that ”falling vote totals for the ruling party predict policy concessions following
the elections, namely increases in education and social welfare spending and decreases in
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military spending” (Miller 2014). There is no connection between regime popularity prior
to elections and spending, which supports the causal claim. As demonstrated by Stasavage
(2005) for the case of democratization in Africa, the introduction of elections at the national
level affects spending redistribution. More specifically, while autocracies had to spend more
on urban population, which poses a revolutionary threat, after the introduction of elections
governments became more responsible to rural groups, which represent the majority of
population and therefore voters. In a different environment, Martinez-Bravo, Padro´ i Miquel
and Qian (2012)have shown that a shift to elections significantly increase public expenditure
at the local level in China. Thus, elections act as a factor stimulating a shift from spending
on less numerous to more numerous groups. They also increase spending on public goods.
Elections has also been connected to redistribution to certain elite groups, serving as a
mechanism of elite management. For the case of Egypt, Blaydes (2008) shows how how
authoritarian regimes can use competitive elections to distribute rents and positions to elite
groups: they act as ”a kind of market mechanism for the selection of those individuals
who will be allowed to extract state rents via both legitimate and illegitimate channels”.
As demonstrated for the case of Russia, elections can serve as a way of evaluating the
performance of regional officials so that higher margin of victory for the ruling party in a
region will lead to higher probability of leader survival (Reuter and Robertson 2012) and
more resources allocated (Frye et al. 2015) - here again, keeping the position or higher
federal support act as rewards.
This review demonstrates that elections and external economic conditions are among
major factors that can shape the spending priorities of a regime. They are also, as it has
been shown earlier, major challenges to hybrid regime survival. While the effects of both
factors on regime dynamics has been extensively studied, the results are inconclusive. In
the following sections I create a theory of spending priorities based on studies of regime
survival and a notion of trade-offs between different groups and objectives, which allows
us to analyze nondemocratic spending policies in a systematic way.
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Spending priorities as survival strategies
Spending as policy
Spending represents an important part of government policies. Even though we can
imagine other aspects of governmental involvement which heavily influence the functioning
of the society, the way state budget is distributed is a major policy instrument. As such, it
can be used to pursue government’s goals. In this regard, it seems appropriate to use public
spending as a proxy to evaluate policy choices.
As noted above, we can imagine many ways the regime may build its relations with
the society and ensure its own survival. Those can include direct management of publicly
owned entities, regulation, building loyalty networks based on familial or patronage con-
nections, state propaganda etc. These strategies are studied elsewhere (Magaloni 2008;
Smith 2005; Truex 2014). Spending represents a convenient proxy for some of them (e.g.
spending on the repression apparatus as a proxy for the use of repression, spending on bu-
reaucracy as a proxy for distributing spoils to state employees) and a separate strategy in
other cases (spending on education as investment in human capital and encouraging certain
long-term demographic trends). Yet throughout this study it is important to remember that I
focus on budget priorities and this excludes some of the important policy instruments avail-
able to the government. Therefore, the argument only refers to government spending, not
all government policies, and all conclusions are restricted to this sphere.
Challenges and policy responses
As demonstrated in the studies on hybrid regime survival, we can distinguish between
two major groups of challenges to the regime stability: external challenges (foreign in-
tervention, spillover effects, global economic conditions) and internal challenges (social
unrest, elite splits). These challenges provoke responses on the part of the regime which
tries to survive. I use two specific examples of challenges to hybrid regimes - an exter-
nal economic crisis and elections - and explore the regime’s response strategies. An eco-
nomic crisis is a type of shock that restrains the resources available to the government and
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so makes the trade-off between immediate survival strategies and more long-term devel-
opment strategies more pronounced - so I expect a shift in priorities from long-term to
short-term spending. Internal challenges can be further subdivided into those coming from
elites and those coming from the masses, with responses shown to correspond to the major
source of the challenge. Elections in non-democracies can be seen a challenge coming from
both sides, being a moment of uncertainty when both the support of elite allies and mass
support is necessary. Therefore, I will consider two alternative hypotheses regarding the
reaction to elections in terms of spending: prioritizing redistribution in favor of the masses
or the elites. In the following sections I describe the above mentioned spending priorities,
construct a space of choice and specify my hypotheses to be tested later.
Survival and development in hybrid regimes
The first two kinds of spending I distinguish are long-term or long-run (LR) and short-
term or short-run (SR) spending.
LR strategies include spending that has long-term returns and offer pay-offs that build
up over time. In a sense, they can all be referred to as public goods too, as their benefits
are highly dispensed (if not non-excludable). The examples of these strategies which I will
analyze are economic development programs, investment in health care and in education.
These policies are important in the long run, so their benefits for the regime are also not
immediate. Thus if they have any effect on regime survival, it’s survival in a rather distant
future, and we would expect the leaders to be short-sighted and autocratic leaders to be
less interested in the citizens’ well-being. Yet it has been demonstrated that even the most
autocratic regimes provide some public services (Ross 2006) and can change the level of
provision in response to changes in the environment (Dizaji and Farzanegan 2014). Further-
more, as shown by Gallagher and Hanson (2009), the provision of public goods is linked to
survival of nondemocratic leaders as they are part of the policy of ”sticks and carrots” that
these regimes use to maintain support.
Short-term (SR) strategies are linked to immediate needs of the regime. These cover
day-to-day spending that ensures the functioning of the state and survival of the citizens.
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Policy choices available to hybrid regimes in the short run include repression and seeking
cooperation through targeted redistribution - the latter aimed at elite or mass groups. Re-
distribution to elites will be evaluated through spending on bureaucracy, redistribution to
mass groups - through social welfare transfers. Repression is frequently included in the
description of non-democratic regime strategies (Gandhi and Przeworski 2006), but notori-
ously hard to quantify. Evaluating repression through the expenditures on public order and
security as a share of all central government expenditures is possible and has been done
before (see, for example, Zavadskaya (2012)). At the same time, as I will show in the next
section when talking about SR strategies in more detail, some types of repression are less
quantifiable through spending on the security apparatus than others.
An economic crisis as an external shock creates strains for the budget, and the choice be-
tween immediate needs (SR spending) and long-term investment (LR spending) is the first
trade-off that the leader may face. As it has been shown, this effect exists both in demo-
cratic and authoritarian regimes, and they both seem to choose short-term over long-term
spending in the time of crisis (Huber, Mustillo and Stephens 2008; Breunig and Busemeyer
2012). Yet only the specific kind of long-term and short-term spending - social spending -
was studied in detail. I will, therefore, test whether the existing expectations are true for the
hybrid regimes as well and explore the effects of crisis as an external shock on other kinds
of long-term and short-term spending. I expect the economic crisis to create incentives for a
relative (as a share of total spending) decrease in long-term spending, as short-term survival
will become both harder and more crucial. This will inform the first set of hypotheses.
SR survival strategies
As described in the previous section, among the SR strategies available to non-democratic
regimes I distinguish repressive strategies and redistribution (to ensure cooperation) to ei-
ther the elite groups or the masses. These types of spending are necessary for immediate
survival and ensure day-to-day support for the regime. I will expect them to be the last
sacrifice in time of crisis.
Redistribution to the masses can be captured by selective transfers in various forms
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(Magaloni 2006). These have been shown to be effective instruments of voter mobilization
((Hicken 2011; Wantchekon 2003)). Parties and other organizational structures may make
it easier to both redistribute and control commitment on the part of the masses.
Selective transfers to elite members take the form of positions and access to power
(Gandhi and Przeworski 2007). This strategy allows the leader to ensure support of the
elite groups. One can think of different approaches to measuring this strategy - a possible
indicator being the share of military expenditures (Gandhi 2008), and at the regional level -
patronage appointments to bureaucratic positions (Remmer 2007).
There are theoretical expectations concerning the use of redistribution strategies as a re-
sponse to electoral challenge. From the one hand, if the top leader is not popularly elected,
the support of the elites dominates the leader’s agenda as it is the base of her survival.
Popular elections quickly increase the role the masses have in regime stability, so that re-
distribution to important constituencies becomes much more prevalent. The logic is similar
to the selectorate theory (De Mesquita 2005).5 .
Elections can also have another consequence - as described in the literature review, in a
nondemocratic setting the incumbent may use elites to mobilize public support and corre-
spondingly redistribute in favor of elites to reward them for cooperation. Therefore, I will
consider two alternative hypotheses about the effect of a publicly elected leader on patterns
of redistribution: one based on the mechanism of direct redistribution to the voters and an-
other based on the assumption of using the elites to mobilize voters and correspondingly
redistributing to elite groups.
This is the same distinction that can be found in the studies of authoritarian survival
5 Empirically, this view is based on the assumption that certain groups are more likely to support the
incumbent, and she knows that. Therefore, being able to manipulate spending to the benefit of specific groups
will be useful to ensure their prolonged support and ultimately her own survival. For the Russian case, the
validity of this assumption can be supported by the survey data which shows, that Vladimir Putin has higher
support among older respondents (over 60 years old), living in small towns or rural areas, and those with
monthly income of RUR 8000-20000 (given the official national average RUR 30 000). VTSIOM, in more
detailed regular surveys, shows that higher approval for Putin is more common among older respondents (age
groups 45 and over), those with lower education, pensioners and housewives (on maternity leave), military
and bureaucrats. As it can be seen, many of these groups are recipients of state support in some form -
I will analyze whether these allocations are changed to ensure their support for the regime under different
challenges. See FOM report (2016), Report of the State Statistics Service (2016), VTSIOM survey report
(2015)
12
which proposed that an autocrat who wants to keep her position will try to ensure the support
of both elite and mass groups (De Mesquita 2005; Magaloni and Kricheli 2010). In a similar
manner, elections can be treated as a challenge from the masses and therefore primarily
stimulating mass-oriented response strategies. Yet they are not necessarily or not only that.
Talking specifically about elections, Brownlee (2011) distinguishes between three major
roles of authoritarian elections: ”a valve releasing social discontent and enabling the regime
to survive crises ... moments of clientelistic transactions between candidates and voters ...
performance displaying a regime’s power and evoking awe among voters”. As can be seen
from this citation, all these functions are focused on the interaction with the electorate or the
masses. An alternative view on elections in nondemocratic settings is proposed by Blaydes
(2008) - she treats legislative elections as a mechanism for elite management. In a similar
manner, I argue that executive elections create uncertainty about the outcome and stimulate
the redistribution of resources in favor of elite groups to ensure their support.
These two alternative explanations - elections perceived by the incumbent as a challenge
from the masses needing a corresponding response or as a potential challenge from elite
groups - will be the base of two alternative hypotheses. Testing them using available data
will allow me to evaluate, how leaders perceive elections and which strategies they choose
to address this specific challenge.
Finally, there is the repressive strategy - if the regime can’t ensure cooperation on the
part of the citizens, it can use force to ensure its survival. Unfortunately, using spending on
law enforcement and security agencies as an estimate of this strategy, I at best can’t distin-
guish between elite and mass-oriented repression. At worst - there is an indistinguishable
line between ensuring necessary order and suppressing citizens. And even more, it seems
that only specific kinds of repression (detention of dissidents, increased pressure through
hiring more security officers, building new facilities etc.), mostly aimed at mass dissent,
can be proxied. All these considerations need to be taken into account when evaluating
the repressive strategy. Repression will be taken into account as one of the SR spending
priorities, but won’t be analyzed in the elites vs. masses part due to these restrictions.
The described properties of SR strategies and their predicted response to the internal
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challenge - elections - inform the second set of hypotheses.
Hypotheses
Following the theory in the previous sections, the decision space for the leader facing
challenges to regime survival can be represented by the table below.
Survival strategies
Target groups
Elites Masses
Long term
(investment)
Public goods Economic development, health care, education
Short term
(consump-
tion)
Redistribution
through se-
lective
transfers
Spending on adminis-
trative staff and oper-
ations, military spend-
ing
Social security pro-
grams, pensions
Repression Spending on security apparatus in general
Table 1: Spending categories representing various policy strategies
Hypothesis 1 External economic crisis will have positive effect on short-term spending
categories and negative effect on long-term spending categories as a share of total budget
spending.
Hypothesis 2a Elections will have positive effect on spending categories targeted at
mass population groups and negative effect on spending categories targeted at elite groups
as a share of total budget spending.
Hypothesis 2b Elections will have positive effect on spending categories targeted at
elite groups and negative effect on spending categories targeted at mass population groups
as a share of total budget spending.
In addition to that, I expect a mediating role of general regime competitiveness. Non-
competitive elections mean that redistribution may even not be necessary - there is no un-
certainty associated with elections, so neither elite groups nor the masses would need to
be appeased. That determines the inclusion of regime competitiveness in the models as an
interaction term for the elections variable:
Hypothesis 3 The higher the regime competitiveness, the more pronounced redistribu-
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tive effects will be.
Introducing the case
I test my theory using subnational spending in Russia from 2001-2014. To use this
case for the theory above, several conditions need to be satisfied. First, Russian regional
regimes would need to be a suitable example of hybrid regimes in the examined period.
Second, more specifically, one needs to check whether using subnational data changes any
of the basic assumptions of the theory substantively and if it does, then the theory should
be modified to reflect these changes.
Russian regions as hybrid regimes
I claim that Russia can be both characterized as a hybrid regime and demonstrates va-
riety of subnational regimes. Russia, as of the end of 2001, was classified as a competitive
authoritarian regime (Diamond 2002), more contemporary accounts also place it in this
category (Petrov, Lipman and Hale 2014). Besides that, the development and endurance
of Russian subnational regimes has been demonstrated in numerous studies (Gelman and
Ryzhenkov 2011) and widely exploited in comparative research.
Regarding more specific characteristics relevant to the present study, during the 2000s
a major institutional change was introduced regarding the process of selection of regional
leaders (heads of the regional executive). From 1996 to 2004, most regional executives
were directly elected by the population, while from 2005 until 2012 they were appointed
by the president more or less in consultation with the dominant party. Starting from late
2012, the elections were reinstated, though in a restricted manner (with limitations on can-
didate selection). That all happened against the background of ”pendulum-like trajectory
of relations between the central and regional elites”, when the more decentralized period of
the 1990s was followed by centralization of the 2000s (Sharafutdinova 2010; Moses 2014).
At the same time, regional legislative elections were never abolished and were playing an
important part in regional political dynamics throughout the whole period. The competitive-
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ness of these elections varied between the regions as well as across time. This all allows us
to categorize Russian regions as hybrid regimes throughout the whole period while having
distinct periods with and without popular elections of the top executive. Therefore, I will
use this major change from elected to appointed governors, as well as the level of regime
competitiveness in general, to analyze the effects of elections on spending priorities.
Going to subnational level - adapting the theory
When taking the theory of regime survival strategies to the subnational level, it is nec-
essary to consider several important points. The benefit of the subnational approach is that
it allows us to conduct a large-N study while keeping constant the nation-specific context
that compromises cross-national comparisons, while addressing important issues of within-
country variation and spatially-uneven nature of certain political processes (O’Donnell
1999; Snyder 2001). At the same time, simple translation of theories of national poli-
tics to the subnational level is dangerous, as it ignores one of the major determinants of
subnational politics its relationship with the higher level of authority and dependence on
the national politics.
Connections to national level
When talking about subnational regimes, the basic assumption stays the same - the regional
leader wants to stay in power as long as possible. To maintain power, she needs to have
the support of at least some mass groups in the region and regional elites. At the same
time, theories of subnational authoritarianism bring some important considerations about
the stability of subnational elites and the role of national level politics in that.
Scholarship on subnational authoritarianism addresses an interesting issue of discrep-
ancy between the national and regional political regimes. Gibson (2005) describes the situ-
ation of regional authoritarian enclaves surviving due to allies and resources at the national
level. It appears reasonable to assume that the presence of allies and resources at the na-
tional level makes it easier for regional incumbents to survive. These connections and
resources will be an important control variable to complement survival strategies specified
earlier for national-level regimes.
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Regional leader’s political resources at the national level can be measured through sev-
eral indicators, depending on the specific characteristic of the national political system and
federal relations: from party affiliations (as in Latin American contexts of the presence of
several parties with developed regional structures) to personal connections (as in Chinese
single-party experience, when personal connections through common experience with na-
tional leadership has been shown to matter for elite promotion). In case of Russia, two
possible approaches can be used - one based on political connections, and another based
on financial ties. The minimalist interpretation of political connections is to assume that
the dominant party’s electoral results in the region demonstrate the governor’s ability and
willingness to have good relations with the federal center. This can act as a proxy for the
”good standing” with the federal elite.
As for financial ties, an important characteristic of center-region relationship is the re-
gion’s ability to fund its responsibilities with own taxes (that is, the size of the tax base and
consequent self-sufficiency). In the situation when a significant amount of resources are
distributed centrally, this will mitigate the effect of economic crisis for some regions. For
example, if some regions are able to get the same or almost the same amount of resources as
before, their spending patterns aren’t going to change as drastically as in other regions. As
demonstrated in the literature on fiscal federalism, higher levels of central transfers (as op-
posed to local taxes) in the region’s budget lead to subnational authoritarianism through the
lack of individual economic autonomy (most resources and access to them are controlled
by the regional administration) and taxation-representation link (Gervasoni 2010). Hoffman
and Gibson (2005) further show that lower share of revenue coming from the region’s own
taxes leads to less spending on public services and more spending on salaries and adminis-
trative costs. Thus, the dependence of the regional budget on central transfers will also be
included in my estimations, because it is another (besides elections) factor that determines
the choice between redistribution to ”elites” and ”masses”. Furthermore, this indicator will
generally characterize the leeway of the regional leadership in deciding upon their own
spending priorities as opposed to federally-imposed minimal standards. Therefore, I will
take into account the region’s tax potential.
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Regional spending powers
An important premise of studying regional spending priorities is understanding their
actual level of discretion and the scope of regional variation. Empirical research can provide
evidence on both points, while changes in formal legislation can also support the former.
Existing studies demonstrate there is a significant variation in regional budget spending
even in the 2000s (when centralization tendencies were more pronounced). Thus, as can be
seen from consecutive surveys of the Social Atlas of the Russian Regions (Social Atlas),
as well as the recent report on social expenditures performed by the Higher School of Eco-
nomics (Social Expenditures 2015), there are manifold differences in expenditures at the
regional level (after correcting for the price level). Regions demonstrate different dynamics
of response to the financial crisis of 2008, in terms of spending on economic development,
social policy, and other major categories. Their reaction to the current economic downturn
is also uneven: in 2014, 53 regions decreased spending on economic development (com-
pared to previous year), yet only 9 did the same for the education spending.
From the side of the fiscal legislation, the period in focus (2001-2014) was marked by at
least one major change in federal budget relations. The beginning of this period was marked
by budget reforms which changed the relations between the levels of authority. At the begin-
ning of Putin’s first presidency, the so-called Kozak’s commission recommended important
changes in a rather informal system that existed before that (the one which naturally evolved
after the dissolution of the Soviet union and the weakening of central state in Russia). Im-
plemented in 2003-2004, a set of these changes introduced order in the separation of taxing
and spending responsibilities of different levels of power. In 2003, amendments to the Bud-
get and Tax Codes, as well as federal laws on separations of responsibilities, were aimed at
introducing order and clarity in the highly uneven and informal situation that existed in the
budgetary sphere before that. Among major innovations were the separation of own, shared
and delegated responsibilities, and the principle of funded mandate that is, the idea, that
spending responsibilities cannot be delegated to the lower level without sufficient funds to
exert them (Yakobson 2006).
However, that did not end regional differentiation and only partially limited regional dis-
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cretion in budgetary policy. For example, even after passing ”centralizing” legislation on
social protection which specified regions’ responsibilities in 2005 (monetization), individ-
ual regions passed very different regional legislation enacting it, which largely transformed
the initial provisions (Gontmakher 2005).
Given there were ongoing budget reforms in the period under study, the question of data
consistency becomes important. I argue that formal changes in spending responsibilities of
different levels of authority don’t undermine my main thesis. These changes were imposed
uniformly across regions and types of spending, yet the regions had freedom to decide how
to adopt them - therefore, they can be considered a part of their spending strategies.
Subnational appointments
A specific trait of the Russian case that I’m exploiting is that there is a period when
regional governors were appointed rather directly elected by the population (2005-2012).
When regional governors are appointed by the central authorities, it turns the whole sit-
uation from electoral to bureaucratic politics. Are the incentives of centrally appointed
regional leaders similar to those of unelected national leaders?
In the recent years, many different authors have studied the effects of governors’ ap-
pointments system in China, assuming that the criteria used by the center shape the be-
havior of regional governors and their policy choices. The first widely studied priority is
economic development. Thus, Bo (1996) shows that ”the worse the economic performance
record the more likely the provincial leader will be demoted”. Li and Zhou (2005) find
that both promotion and demotion are dependent on economic performance and conclude
that personnel control is used to stimulate economic growth in China. These examples of
research focus on policy outcomes and central efforts to induce certain behavior. There
are also examples of work showing how the incentives the regional governor affect actual
policy choices. Talking specifically about social spending, Liu (2010; 2011) shows that
Chinese governors prefer to answer the demands of labor first and spend on social security,
making education and health care second-level priority, due to the fear of protest, which is
more likely to come from labor and which negatively affects their potential career.
The mechanisms ensuring this alignment between the central and the regional policy
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objectives in the Chinese case are based on bureaucratic promotion - an official’s prospects
for career advancement are dependent on his/her performance. Yet it has been shown for
the case of the Russian governors, that they normally come from the region they govern,
are rarely promoted (that is, being a governor is the top achievement in their career) or
moved between the regions (Rochlitz, Kulpina, Remington and Yakovlev 2015). Moreover,
decisions on reappointment were made based on political loyalty, not policies or policy out-
comes (Reuter and Robertson 2012). That makes them much less dependent on the federal
center in their policy priority setting and therefore allows us to treat their policy choices
as their own - controlling for the relative amount of financial resources necessary held by
the federal center. That emphasizes once again the importance of taking into account the
region’s own tax base, which was described earlier.
Having went over several important characteristics of subnational leadership and poli-
tics as compared to the nation-state level, I add two important control variables: the level
of financial independence (which will affect spending discretion) and political closeness
to the national leadership (which will affect both availability of specific federal resources
and leader survival). Besides that, when using the proposed theory at subnational level one
should consider the amount of control federal authorities have over regional leaders’ incen-
tives - especially when the regional governors are centrally appointed. It seems that in the
Russian case we can study regional leaders and regional spending priorities as relatively
independent entities, which allows the application of the specified theory.
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Methods
Data sources and variables
Dependent variable(s): budget data
Dependent variables are constructed as the share of a given spending category in the
total regional spending (in percent). Often, researchers use the share of gross national/re-
gional product in similar situations. There are several factors that make data on Russian
gross regional product less reliable. One of the most often voiced is that many companies
that operate in the regions have their headquarters in Moscow, which creates the problem of
proper registration of the location of production and distorts statistical figures like GRP on
formal grounds (Solanko 2003; Herzfeld 2008). This uneven nature of GRP data explains
the choice of the dependent variable.
As described in the theory, I will use 6 specific spending categories relating to different
policy priorities. The first two categories represent a trade-off between redistribution to
elite groups and redistribution to the masses and will be used to evaluate the hypothesis
about the effects of election on their relative importance. I evaluate redistribution to elite
groups through spending on bureaucracy, and more specifically on those employed in the
regional and local executive (”Regional and local administration”). Redistribution to the
masses is analyzed using social welfare spending aimed at specific groups of population,
such as pensioners, urban poor or people with disabilities (”Social policy” category of the
budget). While at any given moment certain amount of state spending will be devoted to
each of those two categories, relative dynamics should be consistent with the theory - that
is, the method of selection of the leader.
The third category is spending on repressive apparatus. It is measured as funds spend on
law enforcement agencies (”Organy vnytrennih del”). That doesn’t include federal agencies
(like the FSB) and approximates regional spending on supporting public order. Together
with the previous two categories, this is a short-term type of spending and as such will be
used to evaluate the hypothesis on long-term vs short-term spending during crisis.
The next three categories are all long-term spending. These are spending on economy
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(in budgets, sometimes called ”National economy”, even though it’s still about the regional
level), health care and education. Spending on regional economy includes such measures
as supporting agricultural producers, investing in industrial infrastructure, budget loans to
producers and others. Individual subcategories here are industry (including mining and
construction), communications, transport etc. Spending on health care is a general cate-
gory covering capital investment, salaries, various types of hospitals and specialized care.
Finally, for the education category it was possible to isolate the type of spending which is
mostly the responsibility of the regional authorities - namely, pre-school and general school
education.
Dependent variables are formed based on the information on specific categories of pub-
lic spending at the regional level. These data come from the yearly reports of the Federal
Treasury, which publishes data on the realized federal and regional budgets of the previous
year. The variables were constructed by the author, by summing up certain lines of spend-
ing, selected from the budget. Based on the sums, I estimated the shares of corresponding
categories in the yearly spending for each region. Different categories do not sum up to the
overall spending in a given year, because only certain categories and lines within them were
picked for theoretical reasons.
During the period under observation, the Federal Treasury changed the format in which
it collects and publishes budget reports - there was a major change in 2005 and some minor
alterations later. That makes studying the whole period challenging. Data prior to 2005
is presented at a much more aggregated level. One of the results is that I use rather crude
measures of spending types: in this earlier period, it is impossible to identify capital and op-
erational spending (for example, spending on building hospitals and on salaries of doctors).
As increasing the period under study is important for theoretical reasons (to get changes
in dependent variables), I chose to maximize the number of years while sacrificing the de-
tail. Every effort was made to ensure the consistency of spending categories throughout the
whole period.
The choice of specific spending categories to address the research question is of special
importance. The major difficulty, as compared to the studies of national-level spending, is
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that regions are not absolutely free in their spending decisions, and a lot of resources are
redistributed according to federal policies and using federal funds. There is no direct way
to select only those spending categories that are consistently and exclusively decided on by
the regions. Two approaches are used to account for this problem, though. The first one
is controlling for the Tax capacity index, which evaluated the region’s ability to fund its
obligations using its own taxes. The logic here is that having higher tax capacity means
having more having your own resources and therefore more discretion in redistributing
funds. The second approach is selecting the lines of regional budgets (within the categories
of interest like education or social policy) that are more the region’s own responsibility and
less prescribed by the federal center. An example would be spending on kindergartens and
general school education in the education category (as opposed to professional and tertiary
education). This was done where the detailed nature of the budgets allowed such operation.
Otherwise, the more general category was used (an example would be spending on health
care, which is not separated into categories for most of the studied period).
Whenever data on a given spending category was not detailed enough for at least part of
the period, the more aggregated version was used (e.g. health care divided into spending on
general hospitals and emergency care after 2005 - and even though emergency care is better
for evaluating regional policies, the whole category of health care spending was used for
the entire period). The full list of budget lines used by year can be found in the Appendix.
Independent variables and controls
The two major groups of explanatory variables are those describing the presence and
competitiveness of elections and those used as an indicator of an economic crisis. For the
executive elections, the basic variable is whether regional leader is centrally appointed or
elected. This variable is constructed as a simultaneous change for all regions starting from
2005 and going through 2012 - the whole period when governors in Russia were appointed.
That is, even if the region is headed by the same elected governor in 2005, the institutional
framework has changes due to the change of rules - and I assume that it will influence
the governor’s incentives (which change from those of an elected politician to those of an
unelected leader even for one and the same person). Competitiveness is measured by the
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winner’s margin of victory in the most recent regional legislative elections (for the periods
when legislative elections were held in SMD - based on gubernatorial elections’ margin of
victory). The period of the economic crisis is approximated by a dummy variable having
the value of 1 for the years 2008-2009 and 0 in all the other years.
Besides that, several important controls need to be introduces, based on the theory ad-
justments for the subnational level. The results of federal legislative elections (voting for
the ’party of power’ - Edinstvo in 1999 and ”United Russia” in 2003, 2007 and 2011 elec-
tions) at the regional level will be used as a proxy for the governor’s loyalty and therefore
potential connections/influence among federal elites6 . I will also use the Tax capacity index
(Tax potential index), calculated by the Ministry of Finance to account for a region’s own
tax base. Tax potential index reflects the region’s tax potential to the national average. Tax
potential is based on the estimates of the predicted volume of region’s tax revenue. These
two variables (governor’s potential influence at the federal center and region’s capacity to
fund itself by own taxes) will not influence the dependent variables (shares of spending on
specific categories) directly, yet I expect them to interfere with the governor’s incentives
when making decisions about response strategies. Governor’s potential influence at the
federal level might increase his chances of survival: he might not face the same need to
redistribute resources just because he can get additional transfers from the center. Regions
with lower tax potential are more dependent on the federal center in getting resources, so
we can at least hypothesize that they can feel somehow more protected in the event of an
external economic crisis and will experience less shock. There are additional controls to
account for other factors that may explain the observed variation in spending. These indica-
tors describe the regions’ social and economic situation (territory, population, employment
etc.) and will be used to control for other (besides institutional variation) factors that may
influence spending priorities. These come from the data base on the Russian regions created
and published by the International Center for the Study of Institutions and Development7
6 Potential influence given by combination of resourcefulness and loyalty
7 Databases created by the International Center for the Study of Institutions and Development as parts
of the project ”Institutions and Economic Development: the Role of Bureaucracy and Experiments and an
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. The complete codebook can be found in the Appendix. I use regional GDP per capita in
comparable prices to control for the level of regional economic development, the population
(total and urban) of a region and the basic indicators of the demographic structure which
should be important for public spending - more specifically, the percent of persons under
and over working age and unemployment level.
In some cases, there are specific and unidirectional expectations concerning the effect
of these factors on outcome variables. Thus, population can reflect the level of demand
for the government services and policies (Syunyaev and Polishchuk 2014; Revenko 2001)
- therefore, I expect a positive effect of population on all types of spending. The urban
population is expected to have negative effect on spending on bureaucracy, health care and
education due to economies of scale and positive effect on spending on security, because
urban centers are more probable sources both of crime and anti-government actions, which
makes spending on security more important. Percent of young (under working age) popu-
lation can have positive effect on spending on welfare (programs supporting families with
children), health care (higher priority given to children health) and education and nega-
tive effect on spending on security (assuming that most crimes are committed by people of
working age). Percent of old (over working age) population should be positively associated
with spending on welfare (pensions) and health care and negatively - with spending on se-
curity (the same assumption that most crimes are committed by people of working age, so
a region with older population will spend less on containing crime and ensuring security).
Finally, unemployment should be positively associated with spending on welfare (unem-
ployment benefits) and spending on security (crime and unrest being positively associated
with unemployment).
Table 2 contains the summary of variables and expectations of relationship between
them formulated according to the hypotheses.
Instrument for Reform Analysis and Evaluation” (2011-2013), supported by the Basic Research Program of
the National Research University ”Higher School of Economics”, https://iims.hse.ru/en/csid/databases
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Model
I have a pooled time-series dataset with N=8310 and T=14 (2001-2014). Even taking
into account that I drop the smaller units that disappear at a certain time point (are absorbed
by larger regions), the panel is still unbalanced due to missing values in some variable at
some time points. Besides that, as common for times series data, there is autocorrelation:
the Wooldridge test for serial correlation is highly significant for all dependent variables,
which is to be expected in this type of data. This will influence the modeling strategy.
The presence of serial correlation violates the requirements for a standard OLS regres-
sion. Confronted with a similar problem, researchers using pooled time-series data have
proposed various solutions. Podesta` (2006) in a review of several examples of research
design demonstrates how specific methodological choices are linked to theoretical assump-
tions made by the authors. For example, he shows that when interested in long-term effects
of various factors on state spending, modeling the dependent variable in terms of level
of spending, not including the lagged dependent variable and fixed effects, is a more ap-
propriate approach. Yet these advantages can be best exploited when the data has certain
econometric properties, and more specifically does not suffer from non-stationarity.
I have two major independent variables - executive elections and external economic cri-
sis. The first is an institutional change, the other - an external shock. They can be argued to
have both immediate short-term and long-term effects, while being rather rapid and unex-
pected events (therefore being similar to what Pierson (2003) would consider a ”tornado”
and a ”meteorite”), yet I would argue that an institutional change such as elections might
take more time to have effect, which will also be more long-term and stable. Additionally,
I run Fisher-type unit-root test for all my dependent variable and discover that at least two
of them are non-stationary (spending on security and on bureaucracy). That requires be-
ing very cautious when drawing conclusions and together with substantial interest in both
long-term and short-term effects motivates me to use an alternative modeling strategy as
well.
I will use two sets of models for each dependent variable. First, I run error correction
models (ECM), which capture the dynamic interaction between the variables of interest.
The dependent variable is constructed as a change in level of the dependent variable. This
model has been used by researchers of public spending priorities (Remmer 2007; Rodden
2003) and is useful while exploring how one variable adapts to changes in another variable.
More specifically, it allows me to trace the immediate reaction of spending patterns on the
two kinds of challenges. This model has its limits which explain the use of another model
to look deeper into the relationship of interest. First of all, due to the specific construction
10 dropped regions: Sevastopol, Crimea, the city of Baikonur, and ’autonomous okrugs’ included in the
bigger regions as a result of administrative transformations
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of the dependent variable, ECM focuses on within-unit (in time) variation and is not useful
in explaining the between-unit variation. This makes it useful for studying the effects of
crisis and elections, as these changes were universal for all the regions and happened at the
same time, therefore, they don’t vary across regions. At the same time, this model does
not include competitiveness, because between-unit variation of this variable is much higher
than within-unit variation, making using ECM less useful in studying this relationship. Ad-
ditionally, interpreting interaction effects in ECM is much less straightforward, so I will
explore this relationship in the next model.
The specific form of the used ECM is:
δY=β0+β1Yit−1+β2δCrisis+β3Crisisit−1+β4δElected+β5Electedit−1+β6δ
∑
+β7
∑
it−1+
uit,
where δY - change in the share of a given spending category in total budget spending from
year t-1 to year t
Yit−1 - share of a given spending category in total budget spending in year t-1
δCrisis - change in the dummy variable for the economic crisis from year t-1 to year t
Crisisit−1 - value of the economic crisis dummy variable in year t-1
δElected - change in the dummy variable for the gubernatorial elections from year t-1 to
year t
Electedit−1 - value of the elections dummy variable in year t-1
δ
∑
- changes in the control variables from year t-1 to year t∑
it−1 - set of control variables, including regional GRP (in fixed prices), index of tax
potential, territory and population (total and urban), level of unemployment, and political
characteristics such as voting for the party of power, in year t-1.
The second type of models I use are the GLS models with panel-corrected standard
errors (PCSE), and more specifically - Prais-Winsten regression. This approach has been
shown to be appropriate for the type of data I use Beck and Katz (1995); Plu¨mper, Troeger
and Manow (2005) and has been applied in similar research Stasavage (2005); Huber,
Mustillo and Stephens (2008). It accounts for the discovered autoregression and allows for
a more direct interpretation of numerical effects of independent variables and especially
their interactions. This model will allow me to look into long-term effects of changes in
independent variables.
The specific form of the model is:
Yit = β0+β1Crisist+β2Crisist−1+β3Electedt+β4Electedt+1+β5Compt+β6Electedt+1∗
Compt + β7
∑
it + uit,
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where Yit - share of a given spending category in total budget spending in year t
Crisist and Electedt- explanatory variable (dummy variable for the crisis or the guberna-
torial elections) in year t
Crisist−1 - lag of the crisis variable
Electedt+1 - lead of the elections variable
Compt - level of regime competitiveness in year t
Electedt+1 ∗ Compt - interaction term between future elections and current regime com-
petitiveness∑
it - set of control variables.
I add the lagged value of the main explanatory variable for hypothesis 1 concerning the
economic crisis - arguing that it might be more important whether the previous year was a
crisis one, as an external economic downturn is an unexpected event and will take time to
influence the spending incentives. For the hypothesis on the effect of elections, on the other
side, I add a lead of the main independent variable, to explore whether it is more important
whether the next year is the one when the leader has a popularly elected status and will
therefore need popular support.
I identified 6 types of budget spending and will run each model for each of them to
evaluate my hypotheses.
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Data analysis
Descriptive statistics
The initial dataset contains 1246 region-year observations on 89 regions. Crimea, Sev-
astopol (due to special status and huge missingness) and the city of Baikonur (special ter-
ritory of a spaceport) were excluded from the analysis. The panel is unbalanced as some
regions disappear at a certain moment due to administrative reorganizations.
The major dependent variables are the shares of regional budget spent on specific ob-
jectives - regional and local bureaucracy, economic development, social policy. Summary
statistics for these variables is presented in the table below.
Min Max Mean Std.Dev.
Economy 1.26 42.54 9.61 4.57
Health care 0.53 22.97 9.65 4.05
Education 3.97 34.28 18.66 4.52
Bureaucracy 0.23 31.83 3.98 1.83
Social policy 1.19 56.44 12.23 4.87
Security agencies 0.00 14.15 2.14 1.48
Table 3: Percent of regional budget, by category
Two of the major independent variables are dichotomous. Every year except for the pe-
riod of 2005-2012 is marked as the period of elected governors, 2008 and 2009 are marked
as the years of exogenous economic crisis.
Values Crisis Elected governors
0 1068 712
1 178 534
Total 1246 1246
Table 4: Main independent variables
Another key independent variable is electoral competitiveness. It was measured using
data on regional legislative elections. As PR elections were introduced at the regional level
starting from 2003 (and happened for the first time after that - sometimes, depending on the
region, as late as 2006), competitiveness of gubernatorial elections was used to account for
the overall regional regime competitiveness before that. In both cases, it was measured as a
margin of victory - a highly competitive situation would be characterized by small margins.
Both measures were centered and scaled before integrating them into one indicator. The
distribution of the resulting variable is presented below. The values range from -1.65 to
2.81 with a mean of -0.02. As can be seen from the graph, the distribution is slightly
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skewed to the right. Again, smaller values represent the cases of initially smaller margins
of victory and therefore higher competitiveness.
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ty
Fig. 1: Regime competitiveness based on gubernatorial and legislative elections
Besides that, there is a set of control variables used to account for the influence of
factors which are not the object of the current study. Some of these were discussed in
the theory section. Control variables include regional area and population, urbanization,
characteristics of regional unemployment, national elections’ results. Summary statistics
on these variables are presented below.
Min Max Mean Std.Dev.
GRP per capita (thousand rubles) 8.04 3004.79 198.21 264.00
Population (thousand) 16.30 12108.26 1674.95 1657.92
Urb.population (thousand) 0.00 11971.66 1233.47 1479.71
Under working age (percent) 0.00 64.21 29.99 7.50
Over working age (percent) 0.00 52.30 32.67 9.59
Unemployment (percent) 0.00 67.70 8.61 6.40
Tax potential index 0.08 13.89 0.96 1.36
Edinstvo/UR vote 1.06 99.48 47.68 18.03
Table 5: Control variables
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Results and discussion
Error correction models: exploring dynamic relationship
As discussed in the previous section, I use two kinds of models to explore relationships
between the variables of interest. For the error-correction model, the dependent variable is
the change in spending compared to the previous year, by category, while on the right hand
side are the changes (first differences) and lagged values of the independent variables, as
well as the lagged level of dependent variable (LDV) to account for trends in the data. This
allows us to see how shifts in spending are connected to changes in independent variables -
most notably, crisis and the introduction of executive elections, - while taking into account
the found autocorrelation.
When interpreting the results, what I am most interested in are the coefficients on the
lagged variables, which reflect the more consistent dynamic relationship between the vari-
ables. The results of estimations are presented in Table 6. Separate models were run for
each of the spending categories, dependent variable being the share of this type of spending
in the total regional budget spending in a given year 11 . As can be seen fromR2, the models
explain from 31 to 55% of variation of the dependent variables. Those are reasonably high
given the complex nature of process under study.
The results of estimation strongly support Hypothesis 1: crisis is positively related to
changes in welfare and security spending (short-term), and negatively related to changes in
all categories of long-term spending. That is, we see a predicted redistribution in favor of
short-term response strategies in the face of a crisis.
Coefficients for lagged values of the elections variables are insignificant for both welfare
and bureaucracy spending - the two types of short-term spending that I am looking at to
evaluate the effect of elections (there are significant coefficients for the changes - but those
may reflect spurious reactions of spending variables). That prevents me from drawing any
specific conclusions regarding Hypotheses 2a and 2b. As for Hypothesis 3, competitiveness
was not included into this model. Therefore, ECM allowed me to evaluate Hypothesis 1 and
demonstrate that there is an expected relationship between crisis and spending strategies a
shift from long-term to short-term spending as a response to crisis.
Most of the control variables have the expected effect on spending as well. The percent
of young population has a positive effect on spending on education and negative on security.
That is, as I expected, the percent of children (which is equivalent to percent of population
under working age) is positively associated with the share of regional budget devoted to
kindergartens and schools funding and leads to lower spending on security. At the same
11 In comparative studies, a more often used measure is percent of GDP. I commented on the quality of
Russian GRP data earlier, yet I re-ran analysis using percent GRP as a dependent variable for robustness
check. The results are close enough to those presented here and can be found in Appendix 3.
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time, it is negatively associated with spending on economy (for which I didn’t have specific
expectation) and on health (contrary to my expectation). The percent of old population
has expected effects on spending on welfare (positive) and security (negative), while also
being negatively associated with spending on economy (no specific expectation) and health
(contrary to the expectation). Finally, unemployment, as expected, is positively associated
with spending on security and social welfare. The counterintuitive fact that both percent of
children and percent of old people in population are negatively associated with spending on
health care deserves a separate explanation. Yet, within the scope of the present project, I
can not find a plausible theory for this relationship.
These results take me back to the discussion of model selection. As expected, the error-
correction model was able to catch the dynamic relationship between the variables - yet
the elections, which I expected to be more of a ”meteorite” (fast-forming cause leading to
longer-lasting effects), don’t appear as significant determinants of changes in the dependent
variables. Therefore, I proceed to the second model, which should explore deeper structural
relationship between the variables.
Prais-Winsten regressions: exploring structural relationship
The results of estimating the Prais-Winsten regressions are presented in Table 7. As
can be seen, separate effects are estimated for ”elected” (that is, whether in a given year
regional governors are elected) and ”elect lead” (whether next year regional governors will
be elected), as well as for crisis (in the current year) and lagged crisis (1-year lag). Ad-
ditionally, the inclusion of competitiveness and interacting competitiveness with elections
variables allows me to evaluate the effect of elections on spending in different political
environments. The models explain from 22 to 60% of variation in the dependent variable.
As can be seen from the results, there is a significant increase (by over 2% of total
spending) in social welfare spending in the years following the beginning of the economic
crisis (that is, years 2009-2010 for the 2008-2009 economic crisis). That agrees with Hy-
pothesis 1, moreover, it tells us that the increase is not immediate and appears as a reaction
to crisis with a lag. There is no significant effects for other short-run spending categories.
Among the LR spending variables, spending on economic programs and health care behave
as predicted (dropping by 2.8% and 2.3% of total budget correspondingly). Those cate-
gories of spending get less funding in the years of crisis, but there is no significant effect
the years after that. Spending on education doesn’t have significant effect. The inclusion of
both current crisis and lagged variable, therefore, allows us to see the differentiated reaction
in terms of spending strategies: while the share of long-term spending decreases immedi-
ately during external economic shock, it takes some time before welfare spending catches
up, after the mass groups have experienced the effects of crisis and can place their demands
on state support. Overall, these results are consistent with Hypothesis 1.
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As for the effect of elections and regime competitiveness, due to the presence of the
interaction terms, I present the results in the marginal effects plots (Figure 2). The aver-
age marginal effect of ”elected” on social welfare spending is around -3 and the average
marginal effect of ”elected” on spending on bureaucracy is around 1. Both are always
significantly different from zero. The average marginal effect of ”elect lead” is never sig-
nificantly different from zero (meaning there is no effect of anticipation). That is, in the
period when governors are elected, spending on welfare programs is lower by 3% of total
regional budget as compared to the period of appointed governors. Spending on bureau-
cracy during the period of elected governors is higher by an average of 1% of total regional
budget12 . This is consistent with Hypothesis 2b: when regional leaders face the potential
challenge of popular elections, resources are redistributed towards the elite groups. As we
see from the graphs, lower values of regime competitiveness index (which corresponds to
lower margins of victory and therefore higher competitiveness) are associated with more
pronounced redistributive effects, which supports Hypothesis 3.
Among the control variables, several show significant and substantial effects. Percent of
young population has negative association with spending on security (opposite to expecta-
tions) and bureaucracy and positive with spending on education (as predicted). Percent of
old population is negatively associated with spending on bureaucracy and positively with
spending on welfare (as predicted) and education. Unemployment is positively associated
with spending on welfare and security (both correspond to expectations) and negatively
with spending on education.
Short term Long term
Elite Mass Public goods
Bur. Welf. Secur. Econ. Health. Educ.
LDV ab -.246***
(.019)
-.247***
(.023)
-.380***
(.030)
-.373***
(.022)
-.234***
(.023)
-.160***
(.017)
d.crisis -.011
(.076)
-.637***
(.211)
.341***
(.077)
-
3.118***
(.315)
-
3.090***
(.231)
-.888***
(.192)
crisis.lag -.004
(.096)
1.571***
(.267)
.808***
(.099)
-
1.997***
(.394)
-
2.484***
(.281)
-
1.963***
(.244)
d.elected .922***
(.069)
-
2.133***
(.188)
-.307***
(.082)
-.002
(.283)
-
4.068***
(.204)
-1.025
(.175)
elected.lag .050
(.073)
-.258
(.212)
.118
(.092)
-.951***
(.293)
-.804***
(.239)
-.367**
(.182)
12 As an example, an average regional budget in 2005 is about 33 billion rubles a year, so 3% of this sum
would be about 1 billion rubles or 28 million dollars according to 2005 currency rate
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(Table 6 continued)
Short term Long term
Elite Mass Public goods
Bur. Welf. Secur. Econ. Health. Educ.
d.GRP.cap .001
(.001)
-.008***
(.003)
.003***
(.001)
-.007*
(.004)
-.008***
(.003)
-.015***
(.003)
GRP.cap.lag -.001***
(.000)
.0003
(.001)
-.002***
(.000)
.001
(.001)
-.003***
(.001)
.001
(.001)
d.Population -.003*
(.002)
-.006
(.005)
-.001
(.002)
.003
(.007)
.000
(.005)
.007
(.004)
Population.lag .000
(.000)
.000
(.000)
.000**
(.000)
-.000
(.000)
.000
(.000)
.000*
(.000)
d.Urban .003
(.002)
-.001
(.005)
-.002
(.002)
-.005
(.007)
-.009*
(.005)
-.013***
(.004)
Urban.lag -.0001
(.000)
.000
(.000)
-.0001
(.000)
.000
(.000)
.000
(.000)
-.000
(.000)
d.Perc.young -.163***
(.029)
.535***
(.085)
-.215***
(.030)
-.306***
(.119)
.282***
(.087)
.625***
(.077)
Perc.young.lag -.003
(.007)
-.007
(.019)
-.041***
(.007)
-.072***
(.028)
-.027
(.020)
.070***
(.018)
d.Perc.old -.010
(.014)
.028
(.040)
-.031**
(.015)
-.072
(.060)
-.010
(.043)
.008
(.037)
Perc.old.lag -.004
(.004)
.041***
(.012)
-.020***
(.004)
-.037**
(.017)
-.035***
(.012)
.002
(.010)
d.Unemployment -.000
(.012)
.094***
(.034)
.046***
(.012)
-.052
(.050)
.018
(.036)
-.021
(.031)
Unempl.lag -.005
(.006)
.053***
(.018)
.029***
(.006)
-.007
(.026)
.024
(.018)
-.012
(.016)
d.Tax.potential .076
(.043)
.100
(.119)
-.009
(.044)
.179
(.179)
-.132
(.127)
-.102
(.110)
Tax.potential.lag .038
(.026)
.060
(.071)
-.007
(.026)
.006
(.110)
.073
(.076)
.002
(.067)
d.UR.vote -.002
(.002)
.016**
(.007)
-.003
(.002)
.084***
(.010)
-.036***
(.007)
-.053***
(.006)
UR.vote.lag -.003
(.002)
.003
(.005)
.002
(.002)
.009
(.008)
-.027***
(.006)
-.015***
(.005)
constant 1.292***
(.298)
1.675**
(.767)
2.110***
(.302)
6.807***
(1.152)
6.080***
(.897)
3.209***
(.740)
R2 0.34 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.55 0.31
N 1,037 1,037 1,037 1,037 1,037 1,037
Table 6: Results of the ECM
a * significant at 0.1 level, ** significant at 0.05 level, *** significant at 0.01 level
b Standard errors in parentheses
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Short term spending Long term spending
Elite Mass Public goods
Bur. Welf. Secur. Econ. Health. Educ.
crisis -.022
(.275)
-1.207
(.795)
.067
(.387)
-2.757***
(1.070)
-2.343**
(1.118)
.083
(1.094)
crisis.lag -.218
(.282)
2.104***
(.815)
.110
(.395)
-.075
(1.095)
-.981
(1.139)
-.258
(1.135)
elected.lead -.071
(.259)
-.640
(.716)
-1.299***
(.365)
-.591
(.966)
-.939
(1.024)
.061
(1.023)
competitiveness .014
(.076)
-.087
(.197)
.057
(.063)
-.044
(.307)
-.335**
(.164)
-.501**
(.211)
elect.lead*comp .021
(.056)
-.059
(.248)
-.136***
(.052)
-.276
(.456)
-.056
(.182)
.006
(.217)
elected 1.00***
(.253)
-3.094***
(.720)
-.309
(.360)
.433
(.972)
-3.732***
(1.014)
-1.498
(1.028)
elected*comp -.135**
(.060)
.156
(.250)
.053
(.051)
.897**
(.443)
.189
(.180)
.244
(.220)
GRP per capita
(bln)
-.004***
(.001)
.008***
(.002)
-.003***
(.001)
-.006
(.004)
-.013***
(.003)
.006*
(.003)
Population .000***
(.000)
-.000
(.000)
.001***
(.000)
.0002
(.001)
.000
(.000)
.001***
(.000)
Urb.populaion -.001***
(.000)
.000
(.000)
-.001***
(.0001)
.000
(.001)
-.000
(.000)
-.001***
(.000)
Percent young -.060**
(.024)
.099
(.074)
-.048*
(.028)
-.050
(.092)
-.003
(.092)
.305***
(.107)
Percent old -.024*
(.014)
.274***
(.042)
-.021
(.014)
-.067
(.044)
-.047
(.046)
.134***
(.047)
Unemployment .021
(.021)
.137**
(.060)
.063***
(.016)
-.081
(.065)
-.042
(.056)
-.155***
(.060)
Tax potential .170***
(.044)
-.298
(.120)
.075*
(.045)
.656**
(.321)
.136
(.142)
-.695***
(.173)
UR vote -.004
(.007)
.022
(.020)
-.007
(.009)
.055*
(.028)
-.046*
(.027)
-.001
(.029)
constant 6.783***
(.981)
-1.479
(3.024)
4.968***
(1.098)
11.670***
(3.923)
18.306***
(3.818)
7.677*
(4.118)
R2 0.56 0.35 0.60 0.22 0.54 0.31
Rho .51 .49 .40 .44 .50 .53
N 956 956 956 956 956 956
Table 7: Results of Prais-Winsten regressions
a * significant at 0.1 level, ** significant at 0.05 level, *** significant at 0.01 level
b Standard errors in parentheses
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(b) spending on social welfare
Fig. 2: Marginal effects of elections on spending
The analysis demonstrated that both the change and the level of spending are affected
by the external economic shock. More specifically, in both models I see the increase of
welfare spending and the decrease of spending on economic programs and health care as a
response to crisis. This corresponds to Hypothesis 1, which therefore finds partial support
in my data: an external economic crisis leads to a relative redistribution from long-term
spending categories to short-term spending categories. The models differ in the estimated
effects of crisis on security spending and spending on education. The former can be at least
partially explained by the nature of the data. As discussed earlier, measuring repression
through spending on law enforcement agencies is problematic. In addition to that, deeper
exploration of the temporal patterns in data shows an unexpected drop in this category of
spending after 2011. As for the spending on education, one of the things the results may be
describing is the specific nature of this kind of spending compared to spending on health
care, with which they are generally considered together. The share of fixed costs (mostly
public workers’ salaries) is higher in education, whereas spending on health care more often
includes buying modern equipment and materials, which can be more easily cut (or made
de facto the responsibility of the patient), which explains that health care spending responds
more clearly to the crisis.
The effect of elections should be more extended in time. I discover this kind of effect
using the Prais-Winsten regression: focusing on two types of spending as specified in the
theory, I find that spending on social programs is lower when the top regional executive is
elected, while spending on bureaucracy is higher. That means redistribution in favor of elite
groups at the expense of mass social groups and supports the hypothesis that elections in
the Russian regions function in the large part as an elite management mechanism. Elections
create uncertainty for the incumbent, which tries to manage it by ensuring the support of
elite groups.
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Finally, regime competitiveness was shown to be important for redistribution strategies -
higher competitiveness combined with the period of elections leads to even lower spending
on social welfare and higher spending on bureaucracy. That is, it doesn’t change the sign
of effect, but influences its size (exactly as predicted). In sum, I find partial support for
Hypothesis 1 and full support for Hypotheses 2b and 3.
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Conclusion
This research started with the position that nondemocratic regimes face various chal-
lenges to their stability, and these can lead to various outcomes (stabilizing or destabilizing,
liberalizing or deliberalizing). I argued that one of the factors determining the outcome is
not just the nature of the challenge or the environment, but the regime’s reaction to it and
its ability to effectively handle it using available policy instruments.
Examining public spending as one of such policy instruments, I analyzed how subna-
tional hybrid regimes in Russia responded to two different types of challenges. The first
is the internal political challenge of elections, which creates a moment of uncertainty as
the incumbent faces pressure both from the elites and the masses. The second is an ex-
ternal economic crisis, which puts strains on any regime, but is argued to be a moment of
especially profound vulnerability for non-democracies.
I show that the economic crisis is associated with a decrease of spending on supporting
the economy and health care and an increase of spending on social welfare. That corre-
sponds to the expected decrease of long-term and relative increase of short-term spending,
as the crisis affects both the pool of available resources and the need for them, and makes
the immediate survival pressures more important than long-term development and invest-
ment in human capital. Elections were shown to have a positive effect on spending on the
bureaucracy and a negative effect on mass social welfare programs. This supports the hy-
pothesis that elections are used for elite management - elected leaders redistribute resources
to elite groups to ensure their cooperation.
While the framework of comparative research at subnational level has many advan-
tages, it raises the question of generalizability. The conducted analysis definitely shed light
on how subnational regimes in Russia react to popular elections of the executive and global
economic crisis. These findings should be valid for the national level as well, given that
I controlled for the major differences between regional and national politics. I would ar-
gue that the trade-off between long-term and short-term spending during economic crisis
will reproduce irrespective of country and political regime, and we should see the same
pattern. As for elections, the presence of two alternative theories for hybrid regimes alone
suggests there will be more national variation and factors determining the choice of specific
redistribution strategy. Yet methodologically, the proposed scheme proved to be a useful
instrument in analyzing policy choices, and could be used in different contexts. That is,
the two-dimensional space which includes different time horizons (long-term vs short-term
spending) and redistribution to different groups (in the most general case, elite vs mass
groups) can be a informative analytical tool.
The starting point of my theory was that the autocrat wants to maintain power and
because of that desire adopts certain survival strategies in response to various challenges.
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Therefore, I focused on what the autocrat considers important in different situations and
how she acts. The next step is examining the effects of these choices. This will connect
this project with the existing theory on regime survival and answer the question of whether
some strategies (even if we are talking only about budget redistribution) are associated with
higher probability of regime survival, and what are the effects (liberalizing or deliberalizing)
of particular spending choices.
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APPENDIX A: BUDGET LINES INCLUDED INTO SPENDING DATABASE
Year Category
2001
Head of state, head of the regional executive
Regional executive
Local government
Law enforcement agencies
Industry, energy generation, construction
Agriculture
Water resources management
Forestry
Motor transport
Rail roads and transportation
Water transport
Transport other
Communication
Information technologies
Pre-school education
School education
Health care
Social policy
2002
Head of state, head of the regional executive
Regional executive
Local government
Law enforcement agencies
Industry, energy generation, construction
Agriculture
Water resources management
Forestry
Transportation, communication, information technologies
Pre-school education
School education
Health care
Social policy
42
(Appendix A continued)
Year Category
2003
Head of state, head of the regional executive
Regional executive
Local government
Law enforcement agencies
Industry, energy generation, construction
Agriculture
Water resources management
Forestry
Transportation, communication, information technologies
Pre-school education
School education
Health care
Social policy
2004
Head of state, head of the regional executive
Regional executive
Local government
Law enforcement agencies
Industry, energy generation, construction
Agriculture
Water resources management
Forestry
Transportation, communication, information technologies
Pre-school education
School education
Health care
Social policy
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(Appendix A continued)
Year Category
2005
Head of the regional executive, head of local administration
Regional executive, local administration
Law enforcement agencies
Economy - general issues
Fuel and energy generation
Replacement of natural reserves
Agriculture and fishery
Water resources management
Forestry
Transportation
Communications and information technologies
Pre-school education
School education
Health care
Pensions
Social services delivery
Social welfare
Foster care, custody
Social policy research
Social policy - other
2006
Head of the regional executive, head of local administration
Regional executive, local administration
Law enforcement agencies
Economy - general issues
Fuel and energy generation
Replacement of natural reserves
Agriculture and fishery
Water resources management
Forestry
Transportation
Communications and information technologies
Pre-school education
School education
Health care
Pensions
Social services delivery
Social welfare
Foster care, custody
Social policy research
Social policy - other
44
(Appendix A continued)
Year Category
2007
Head of the regional executive, head of local administration
Regional executive, local administration
Law enforcement agencies
Economy - general issues
Fuel and energy generation
Replacement of natural reserves
Agriculture and fishery
Water resources management
Forestry
Transportation
Communications and information technologies
Pre-school education
School education
Health care
Social policy
2008
Head of the regional executive, head of local administration
Regional executive, local administration
Law enforcement agencies
Economy - general issues
Fuel and energy generation
Replacement of natural reserves
Agriculture and fishery
Water resources management
Forestry
Transportation
Communications and information technologies
Pre-school education
School education
Inpatient care
Outpatient care
Emergency services
Sanatoriums, prevention and recovery facilities
Donated blood management
Outpatient care in hospitals
Social policy
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(Appendix A continued)
Year Category
2009
Head of the regional executive, head of local administration
Regional executive, local administration
Law enforcement agencies
Economy - general issues
Fuel and energy generation
Replacement of natural reserves
Agriculture and fishery
Water resources management
Forestry
Transportation
Communications and information technologies
Pre-school education
School education
Inpatient care
Outpatient care
Emergency services
Sanatoriums, prevention and recovery facilities
Donated blood management
Outpatient care in hospitals
Social policy
2010
Head of the regional executive, head of local administration
Regional executive, local administration
Law enforcement agencies
Economy - general issues
Fuel and energy generation
Replacement of natural reserves
Agriculture and fishery
Water resources management
Forestry
Transportation
Communications and information technologies
Pre-school education
School education
Inpatient care
Outpatient care
Emergency services
Sanatoriums, prevention and recovery facilities
Donated blood management
Outpatient care in hospitals
Social policy
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(Appendix A continued)
Year Category
2011
Head of the regional executive, head of local administration
Regional executive, local administration
Law enforcement agencies
Economy - general issues
Fuel and energy generation
Replacement of natural reserves
Agriculture and fishery
Water resources management
Forestry
Transportation
Communications and information technologies
Pre-school education
School education
Inpatient care
Outpatient care
Emergency services
Sanatoriums, prevention and recovery facilities
Donated blood management
Outpatient care in hospitals
Social policy
2012
Head of the regional executive, head of local administration
Regional executive, local administration
Law enforcement agencies
Economy - general issues
Fuel and energy generation
Replacement of natural reserves
Agriculture and fishery
Water resources management
Forestry
Transportation
Communications and information technologies
Pre-school education
School education
Inpatient care
Outpatient care
Emergency services
Sanatoriums, prevention and recovery facilities
Donated blood management
Outpatient care in hospitals
Social policy
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(Appendix A continued)
Year Category
2013
Head of the regional executive, head of local administration
Regional executive, local administration
Law enforcement agencies
Economy - general issues
Fuel and energy generation
Replacement of natural reserves
Agriculture and fishery
Water resources management
Forestry
Transportation
Communications and information technologies
Pre-school education
School education
Inpatient care
Outpatient care
Emergency services
Sanatoriums, prevention and recovery facilities
Donated blood management
Outpatient care in hospitals
Social policy
2014
Head of the regional executive, head of local administration
Regional executive, local administration
Law enforcement agencies
Economy - general issues
Fuel and energy generation
Replacement of natural reserves
Agriculture and fishery
Water resources management
Forestry
Transportation
Communications and information technologies
Pre-school education
School education
Inpatient care
Outpatient care
Emergency services
Sanatoriums, prevention and recovery facilities
Donated blood management
Outpatient care in hospitals
Social policy
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APPENDIX B: CODEBOOK
Variables/ com-
ments
Values/ mea-
surement
Code name Time span Source
Budget data
Total spending (in
year X for region
Y)
Thousand
rubles
total 2001-2014
Author’s estimate
(Federal treasury
reports)
Healthcare Category,
thousand
rubles
health 2001-2014
Education Category,
thousand
rubles
educ 2001-2014
Social policy Category,
thousand
rubles
socpol 2001-2014
Bureaucratic ap-
paratus
Category,
thousand
rubles
bureau 2001-2014
Law enforcement/
Security
Category,
thousand
rubles
secur 2001-2014
Supporting re-
gional economy
Category,
thousand
rubles
econ 2001-2014
Political variables
Regional leader
appointed or
elected
1 (elected)
for years
2001-2004
and 2013-
2014, 0
(appointed)
for years
2005-2012
elected 2001-2014 Author’s estimate
Federal elec-
tions - legislative
(”party of power”
performance in
the region)
Edinstvo vote
in 1999, UR
vote in 2003,
2007, 2011
ed vote1999,
reg ur2003,
reg ur2007,
reg ur2011,
ur vote (pulled
variable, vote
share of the
party of power
in the most re-
cent elections,
percent)
2001-2014 1999 - Author’s
estimate (Central
electoral commis-
sion), 2003-2011
- ICSID database
(Central electoral
commission)
49
(Appendix B continued)
Variables/ com-
ments
Values/ mea-
surement
Code name Time span Source
Regional legisla-
tive elections
Previous
elections:
winner,
runner up,
winner’s
share of
votes, runner
up’s share of
votes
reg leg win,
reg leg run,
reg leg winshare,
reg leg runshare
2003-2014 Author’s estimate
(Central electoral
commission,
Reuter (2013))
Regional elec-
tions
Most recent
elections:
winner’s
margin of
victory
margin 2001-... (gu-
bernatorial
elections up
to the first PR
legislative
elections in
the region)
Author’s esti-
mate (media
publications13)
Auxiliary vari-
able whether
margin contains
values for the
latest legislative
or gubernatorial
elections
1 (legislative)
or 0 (guber-
natorial)
legislative 2001-2014 Author’s estimate
Regional regime
competitive-
ness based on
gubernatorial
and legislative
elections
Centered
and scaled
(to corre-
sponding
means and
sd) values of
the ”margin”
comp1 2001-2014 Author’s estimate
ID variables
Region’s unique
ID
reg id 2001-2014
Region’s name
(transliterated)
reg translit 2001-2014
Year of observa-
tion
year 2001-2014
13 large portion of information available through http://www.politika.su/vybory/
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(Appendix B continued)
Variables/ com-
ments
Values/ mea-
surement
Code name Time span Source
Okrug (subre-
gional units that
were included
into bigger re-
gions during
administrative
reform (and
dropped from
analysis))
1 or 0 okrug 2001-2008 Author’s estimate
Region’s characteristics
Area 10 thousands
of square
kilometers
area 10th 2009, 2012 Recalculated
from ICSID
database (Rosstat,
Russian Regions:
Basic character-
istics of subjects
of the Russian
Federation)
Regional bureau-
cracy size
Number of
employees
in regional
executive and
local admin-
istrations
exec 2001-2014 Author’s estimate
(Rosstat, Russian
Regions, Social
and economic
indicators, Labor)
Unemployment
level (based on
ILO methodol-
ogy)
Percent
unemployed
reg levelofunempl 2001-2014 ICSID database
(Rosstat cen-
tral statistical
database, Re-
gional block
Employment and
wages)
Population
younger than
working age
(working age
16-59 for males,
16-54 for fe-
males)
In proportion
to the number
of people of
working age
(percent)
youth perc 2001-2014 Recalculated
from ICSID
database (Rosstat,
Russian Re-
gions, Population
for 2010-2013;
Rosstat Cen-
tral Statistical
Database for
1998-2009)
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(Appendix B continued)
Variables/ com-
ments
Values/ mea-
surement
Code name Time span Source
Population older
than working age
In proportion
to the number
of people of
working age
(percent)
pens perc 2001-2014 Recalculated
from ICSID
database (Rosstat,
Russian Re-
gions, Population
for 2010-2013;
Rosstat Cen-
tral Statistical
Database for
1998-2009)
Population as of
January 1
Total pop-
ulation,
thousand
pop th 2001-2014 Recalculated
from ICSID
database (Uni-
SIS, FSSS,
Demographic
indicators)
Urban popu-
lation, thou-
sand
urbpop th 2001-2014 Recalculated
from ICSID
database (Uni-
SIS, FSSS,
Demographic
indicators)
Tax capacity in-
dex
Region’s
tax capacity
in relation
to national
average
reg inp 2001-2014 ICSID database
(Ministry of
finance, Interbud-
getary relations
Methodology
and results of
federal transfers
distribution)
Gross regional
product, basic
prices
million
rubles
reg grp 2001-2014 ICSID database
(Rosstat, Rus-
sian Regions,
Gross regional
product for 2000-
2009. UniSIS for
2010-2014)
Average price of
the fixed basket of
goods in year X
for region Y
rubles reg gdsfixed 2001-2014 ICSID database
(Rosstat, Russian
Regions, UniSIS)
Gross regional
product, compa-
rable prices
billion rubles grp bln 2001-2014 Author’s estimate
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APPENDIX C: RESULTS OF ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
Share of GRP as dependent variable
Short term Long term
Elite Mass Public goods
Bur. Welf. Secur. Econ. Health. Educ.
LDV -.113***
(.010)
-.228***
(.021)
-.242***
(.022)
-.393***
(.024)
-.173***
(.018)
-.096***
(.011)
d.crisis*** .080
(.028)
.040
(.083)
.127***
(.023)
-.487**
(.214)
-.537***
(.081)
.122*
(.073)
crisis.lag .101***
(.036)
.563***
(.105)
. 234***
(.029)
-.143
(.272)
-.350***
(.102)
-.073
(.093)
d.elected . 363***
(.026)
-.250***
(.075)
.045**
(.022)
.681***
(.194)
-.638***
(.073)
.186***
(.066)
elected.lag .008
(.027)
-.081
(.078)
.108***
(.023)
. 051
(.202)
-.068
(.077)
-.096
(.069)
d.GRP.cap -.001***
(.000)
-.006***
(.001)
.000
(.000)
-.008**
(.003)
-.006***
(.001)
-.011***
(.001)
GRP.cap.lag -.000
(.000)
-.000
(.000)
-.000**
(.000)
.001
(.001)
-.001*
(.000)
.000
(.000)
d.Population -.000
(.001)
-.002
(.002)
-.000
(.000)
.003
(.005)
-.001
(.002)
.000
(.002)
Population.lag -.000
(.000)
-.000***
(.000)
-.018
(.000)
-.000**
(.000)
.000
(.000)
-.000***
(.000)
d.Urban .001
(.001)
.002
(.001)
.000
(.000)
-.00
(.005)
.001
(.002)
.000
(.002)
Urban.lag .000
(.000)
.000***
(.000)
.018
(.000)
.000*
(.000)
.000
(.000)
.000**
(.0001)
d.Perc.young -.025**
(.011)
.195**
(.033)
-.027***
(.009)
.048
(.083)
.126***
(.031)
.145***
(.029)
Perc.young.lag .002
(.006)
.019
(.007)
-.009***
(.002)
-.005
(.019)
.002
(.007)
.022***
(.007)
d.Perc.old -.007
(.005)
-.007
(.016)
-.001
(.004)
-.065
(.041)
.004
(.015)
-.019
(.014)
Perc.old.lag -.006
(.002)
-.010 **
(.004)
-.008***
(.001)
-.063***
(.012)
-.023***
(.004)
-.026***
(.004)
d.Unemployment -.007
(.005)
.066***
(.013)
.027***
(.004)
-.054
(.035)
.006
(.013)
-.016
(.012)
Unempl.lag -.008***
(.002)
.009
(.007)
. 007***
(.002)
-.030*
(.018)
-.003
(.007)
-.015**
(.006)
d.Tax.potential .009
(.016)
.072
(.047)
.001
(.013)
-.116
(.123)
-.227
(.046)
-.060
(.042)
Tax.potential.lag -.013
(.010)
.004
(.028)
-.017**
(.008)
-.017
(.074)
-.003
(.028)
-.016
(.025)
d.UR.vote -.001
(.001)
.002
(.003)
-.000
(.001)
.009
(.007)
-.011***
(.002)
-.014***
(.002)
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(Table 10 continued)
Short term Long term
Elite Mass Public goods
Bur. Welf. Secur. Econ. Health. Educ.
UR.vote.lag -.002
(.0001)
-.004**
(.002)
-.001**
(.001)
-.001
(.005)
-.010***
(.002)
-.009***
(.002)
constant .450***
(.108)
.947***
(.304)
.587***
(.086)
4.062***
(.798)
1.911***
(.312)
1.764***
(.275)
R2 0.34 0.25 0.33 0.25 0.30 0.25
N 1,037 1,037 1,037 1,037 1,037 1,037
Table 10: Robustness check: results of the ECM with percent GRP as dependent variable
a * significant at 0.1 level, ** significant at 0.05 level, *** significant at 0.01 level
b Standard errors in parentheses
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Short term spending Long term spending
Elite Mass Public goods
Bur. Welf. Secur. Econ. Health. Educ.
crisis .041
(.088)
-.141
(.196)
.033
(.079)
-.407
(.301)
-.402*
(.224)
.242
(.229)
crisis.lag -.003
(.098)
.625***
(.208)
.041
(.086)
.318
(.343)
-.029
(.239)
.222
(.240)
elected.lead .000
(.086)
-.212
(.192)
-.274***
(.080)
-.441
(.281)
-.210
(.209)
-.126
(.235)
competitiveness .021
(.031)
.056
(.078)
.018
(.025)
.142
(.173)
-.038
(.064)
-.089
(.066)
elect.lead*comp -.011
(.042)
.024
(.100)
-.086***
(.024)
-.404
(.254)
-.014
(.091)
-.005
(.068)
elected .341***
(.085)
-.551***
(.195)
-.029
(.079)
.536*
(.290)
-.647***
(.205)
-.041
(.234)
elected*comp -.005
(.043)
-.000
(.098)
.031
(.026)
.662***
(.249)
.003
(.091)
.053
(.069)
GRP per capita
(bln)
-.001***
(.000)
.000
(.001)
-.001***
(.000)
-.003
(.002)
-.004***
(.001)
-.001
(.001)
Population -.000***
(.000)
-.001***
(.000)
-.000***
(.000)
-.001***
(.000)
-.001***
(.000)
-.002***
(.000)
Urb.populaion .0003***
(.000)
.001***
(.000)
.000***
(.000)
.001***
(.00)
.001***
(.000)
.002***
(.000)
Percent young .021
(.015)
.118***
(.029)
.000
(.011)
.118**
(.049)
.101***
(.033)
.237***
(.031)
Percent old -.040***
(.008)
.032**
(.015)
-.010***
(.004)
-.103**
(.044)
-.063***
(.018)
-.066***
(.022)
Unemployment -.004
(.014)
.086**
(.034)
.038***
(.009)
-.084
(.083)
-.027
(.024)
-.073***
(.027)
Tax potential -.001
(.065)
-.074
(.056)
.008
(.016)
-.045
(.304)
-.137
(.111)
-.209
(.164)
UR vote .000
(.003)
.007
(.006)
-.001
(.002)
.003
(.011)
-.008
(.007)
.008
(.007)
constant 2.135***
(.587)
-2.022
(1.332)
.841**
(.394)
4.012
(2.591)
3.838***
(1.332)
1.638
(1.471)
R2 0.44 0.40 0.54 0.17 0.46 0.51
Rho .67 .56 .53 .54 .65 .63
N 956 956 956 956 956 956
Table 11: Robustness check: results of Prais-Winsten regressions with percent GRP as dependent variable
a * significant at 0.1 level, ** significant at 0.05 level, *** significant at 0.01 level
b Standard errors in parentheses
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